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ON THE DIFFICULTIES OF CODIFYING
COMMERCIAL LAW
GRANT GILMORE-
The principal objects of draftsmen of general commercial legisla-
tion-by which I mean legislation which is designed to clarify the law
about business transactions rather than to change the habits of the
business community-are to be accurate and not to be original. Their
intention is to assure that if a given transaction involving commercial
paper is initiated, it shall have a specified result; they attempt to state
as matter of law the conclusion which the business community apart
from statute and as matter of fact gives to the transaction in any case.
But achievement of those modest goals is a task of considerable diffi-
culty. The draftsman is called upon to build a coherent pattern out of
the infinite variety of business customs and practices in an unstable
and rapidly changing economy. The more detail and color he loads
into his statute, the sooner it will begin to wither on the vine; if, on the
other hand, he proceeds from generalization to abstraction, his statute
will never be of much use or interest to anyone. The process demands
a nice eye, a steady hand, and a sure judgment.
In this country, there has been extensive codification of commercial
law over the past fifty years in the guise of Acts to Make Uniform the
Laws of Several States-we have gone off the common law standard for
good. It is now suggested that the old Uniform Acts are out-of-date
and should be scrapped in favor of a streamlined Commercial Code.1
There is apparently wide agreement that the law of sales, in par-
ticular, is hopelessly behind the times. Horse law and haystack law
are uneasily tolerated in the complex business of mass production and
national distribution. And yet that law was codified long after horses
and haystacks ceased to be vital objects of commerce. If the 1900
codification failed to bring the law much closer to us than 1850, is there
any reason to believe that the 1950 codification will get us much be-
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yond 1900? It might even be argued, paradoxically, that in 1950 a
Sales Act, vintage 1850, would be much less objectionable than a Sales
Act, vintage 1900. At least a statute a hundred years out of date will
have much less bite left in it and consequently will give freer rein'to
judicial interpretation than will a statute merely fifty years behind
the times.
In order to appreciate why the Uniform Sales Act-that scholarly
reconstruction of nineteenth century law-has proved inadequate, it is
necessary to have some understanding of the type of business organiza-
tion which the common law reflected, and of the ways in which tech-
nological change made many of the old assumptions obsolete. After a
review of nineteenth century developments, we shall be in a position
to consider how far the Revised Sales Act, which is the first publicly
available specimen of the new codifiers' handiwork, takes into account
the changes in business organization which its predecessor neglected.
Finally, we will consider the likelihood of still further changes in the
economic pattern coming to supersede the present facts of business life.
I
English commercial law did not begin its modern development until
late in the eighteenth century. For a century before that, there had
been something like an organized flight from the common law courts
by the merchants. Deprived first of their own courts during the seven-
teenth century and then of recourse to the commercially trained judges
of the Admiralty, merchants were unwilling to submit their disputes to
the stiff-necked judges of King's Bench who had been known to hold
that there was no such thing as a negotiable promissory note.
Not until the period of Lord Mansfield did commercial cases begin
to come in any numbers to the courts and the slow meandering line of
case by case decision did not lead to a comprehensive body of commer-
cial law until well into the nineteenth century. The business organiza-
tion revealed by this body of law is even today not completely irrel-
evant to our problems. The picture was one of a society in the period
which followed its organization for capitalist enterprise but preceded
most of the technological advances of the industrial revolution. The
economy was organized for production, trading and distribution, but
the manufacture was small-scale; distribution was mostly local with
buyer and seller dealing face to face without the interposition of agents,
and goods produced by craftsmen to individual order.
The interlocking set of legal rules which developed to clarify sales
of chattel property was as much property law as it was sales law. This
confusion of unlike concepts had results which were to become increas-




The most resistant of the concepts proved to be the theory of onmer-
ship and the right of the true owner to be protected against those who
deal with his property without authority. If A owned a chattel and
B took it away from him, A still owned it and could get it back-not
only from B but from any one else who might have taken it from B,
even if taken in good faith and relying on B's possession as evidence of
ownership. Similarly, if A entrusted his chattel to a faithless servant
who disposed of it to B contrary to instructions, A could get it back
even though B wore on his candid brow the halo of good faith purchase
for value. Or, if A preferred, he might treat the transaction as a sale
and by his action in conversion receive back the value of the misappro-
priated chattel in lieu of the chattel itself.
Insofar as our early sales lawwas sales law at all-that is, law relating
to the contractual transfer of property rather than a law of ownership-
it focussed on a manual delivery of a simple object from seller to buyer
against a simultaneous payment from buyer to seller. That pattern
being set, the thrust of the law was to conform increasingly intricate
transactions to the simple basic formula-to construe, interpret, and
project in the light of this ideal bargain and sale. But the rights of the
contracting parties were still described in property terms: the location
of title was the key to unlock the most abstruse problems.
The common law of sales was reasonably adequate for the period
during which it was developed. But unfortunately for the prestige of
the law, the tempo of industrial change did not suddenly become static.
Technological changes in the methods of production and distribution of
goods have over the last hundred and fifty years rendered the sturdy
framework of the common law of sales quaint and archaic.
Illustrative of this development is the process by which the basic
assumptions of the law of warranty of quality were undermined. Those
assumptions were that as between one object offered for sale and
another of the same kind there are individual variations of quality; and
that any buyer is as well placed as any seller to determine by casual
inspection the worth of an object and consequently the price he should
offer. Today, as manufactured goods have become increasingly com-
plex and standardized, those assumptions remain valid only for a
limited area of the economy and are hopelessly false as to others. Cer-
tainly the individual consumer is no longer capable of determining the
quality of most of the things he buys, as necessities or luxuries, even
where inspection before purchase is permitted. The retail dealer and
the local or regional distributor are hardly better off: goods sold in
sealed containers necessarily pass down the distribution chain to the
consumer on faith; the man whose business is selling, not making, is no
more competent than the ultimate consumer to determine the quality
of a complex modem machine. Furthermore, as factory inspection
methods improve, one object becomes, with increasing unlikelihood of
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individual variance, like any other, and the sale is made on the manu-
facturer's, or the dealer's, general reputation.
The old assumptions still have a limited validity when applied to
sales to manufacturers of their raw materials, semi-finished goods or
finished components. We may assume that many transactions of this
type are carried out between informed professionals, able to protect
their own interests. Even at this level, however, the precision of the
laboratory has to a notable degree supplanted the rough and ready
bargain and sale contemplated by warranty law. It may be that,
paradoxically, that body of law, manifestly inadequate to protect the
consumer in a world he never made, has become unduly severe in its
operation against sellers who dispose of their product to professionals
more than able to take care of themselves without the haphazard aid
of the warranty law.
The techniques of mass production had other curious effects on the
body of sales law. The common law of sales, in its relation to the man-
ufacture of goods, contemplated Buyer coming to Seller's shop and re-
questing an object to be made for him. Seller accepted the order, made
the object and in due course delivered it to Buyer against cash pay-
ment. This situation differed from the sale of finished goods in that the
process of manufacture continued over a period of time; it was there-
fore necessary to declare the rights of the parties in the event of un-
toward incident during that period. The principal problems were of
accidental destruction of the goods and repudiation of the contract.
Naturally enough recourse was had to property law: at some point of
time the goods became the Buyer's. That point of time was fixed at
the stage where the goods, having been completed, were set aside for
Buyer with his consent-the magic word was appropriation. If Seller
repudiated before appropriation, Buyer had a contract action in dam-
ages; after appropriation, he had, on tender of the price, a possessory
action based on his ownership of the goods; when Seller had resold the
goods, the value of Buyer's action was lessened by the inroads of the
doctrine of good faith purchase for value. If Buyer repudiated before
appropriation, Seller's remedy was in damages; if the goods were in
course of manufacture, the idea of minimization of damages led to the
conclusion that Seller had no right to complete the manufacture; if he
did, his maximum damages were calculated nevertheless as of the point
reached at repudiation. If Buyer repudiated after appropriation,
Seller's action was not for damages but for price. As to destruction of
the goods: the risk, before appropriation, was the Seller's, but the doc-
trine of impossibility operated to void the contract; Seller lost his profit
but escaped liability in damages. After appropriation, Buyer bore the
risk and remained liable for the full price.
Mass production cuts the factual base from beneath the foregoing
analysis. Now, goods are produced according to a prearranged schedule;
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except for output contracts, no allocation of particular goods to par-
ticular orders will be made until after the finished goods reach the
shipping room. Furthermore, the arrangments under which a manu-
facturer disposes of his goods will be continuing ones: forward contracts
covering the buyer's estimated requirements for the next year with pro-
vision for instalment deliveries. Production proceeds under an elab-
orate contractual mechanism: the simple put and take ideas of prop-
erty law no longer, in the event of something going wrong, work out to
an equitable or even a reasonable solution. The idea that a manufac-
turer, on receiving a cancellation, should be under a fancied duty to scrap
work in process to the amount of the cancellation is farcical. The
further idea that a business enterprise, engaged in marketing goods,
should under a particular metaphysical constellation-viz: the goods
have been appropriated, title has passed-have the option to remove
goods from commerce and force them on a buyer who has no use for
them by suing for the price instead of for damages is almost as bad.2
Where the seller repudiates, the results of the application of the old
rules are not quite so absurd: if the buyer follows reasonable commer-
cial practice and covers, his damage action will compensate him for
his loss. The buyer's theoretically available possessory remedies,
after appropriation, have atrophied: if the seller 'has the goods but
chooses not to deliver them, there will be, in the normal course, no
appropriation because that is within the seller's control. There are,
however, fugitive, perhaps misleading, indications that the courts are
beginning to look at this situation through specific performance glasses.
If the seller does not have the goods, a possessory action is a whited
sepulchre anyway. If the seller's failure to deliver is occasioned by
insolvency and the appointment of a creditor's representative, the
buyer will find it hard at best to establish a claim as of right to undeliv-
ered goods; if he has paid in advance, he will be joyfully welcomed into
the brotherhood of unsecured creditors.
Changes in the methods of distribution of goods had effects that
were, if anything, even more far-reaching than the changes in the kind
of goods sold and in the manner of their manufacture. The old law con-
templated local distribution and direct sale from producer to consumer
without benefit of agent; therefore, a buyer who bought from an agent
bought at peril subject to the rights of the true owner. Increasing pro-
ductive capacity demanded an ever-widening area of distribution and
rail transportation made the wider distribution possible. As the system
of local distribution disappeared, the role of the agent, the intermediate
handler, became more important. It became a commercial necessity to
2. Reasonable men differ on this point as on others. For a different evaluation of the
effect of the traditional rules to measure damages, see the comprehensive Comment, Rem-
edies for Total Breach of Contract under the Uniform Revised Sales Ac, infra p. 13O.
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allow purchase from the agent free of underlying claims of ownership-
to give to goods in commerce some of the classical attributes of ne-
* gotiable paper.
The 19th century Factor's Acts were the first attempts to meet the
needs of the expanding distribution system. These Acts protected pur-
chasers from certain types of agents in situations where the true owner
of goods had "entrusted" them to the agent "for sale." No protection
was given where the agent was not a "factor," or when the owner had
not "entrusted," or where there had been an entrusting but not for
sale. More was needed.
What followed was a fascinating exercise in legal ingenuity. The
attempt to warp the old property law in such a way that goods could
be distributed nationally was abandoned, and an independent parallel
body of law based on contract was invented. Goods in transit or in
storage were represented by pieces of paper negotiable in form-bills
of lading or warehouse receipts. Whoever had possession of the piece
of paper, however his possession was acquired, could sell the goods free
and clear. Contrariwise, no one not in possession of the document
could deal in the goods so long as the document remained outstanding.3
The development of the negotiable document of title made it possible
to by-pass entirely the restrictions of the old law. Note however that
the admirable whimsy of dealing with goods as if they were negotiable
was law of, by and for merchants exclusively: goods moved from plant
to distributor on order documents; from distributor to retailer the
order document was available if needed. What the consumer bought
from the retailer, however, was an ordinary non-negotiable chattel to
which he got good title if indeed the retailer had title to give.
Rapid economic progress gradually left us with a body of law which
was in fact applicable only to what had become commercially the least
important segment, although that law in theory was to be applied
generally. Parts of the old law merely became irrelevant in changed
circumstances; for example, the once hotly debated issues of risk of loss
and passage of title, despite the conventional importance with which
they are still treated in law school course and textbook, are of small
moment. The risk question may still be vital to the farmer whose crop
may be destroyed by a hail storm; but crop insurance provides better
protection than the rule of Tarling v. Baxter.4 So far as manufacturers
with goods in storage or in shipment are concerned, they may choose
between insuring the goods or including the occasional loss as an ele-
ment of price.
3. The text states the end result of a fairly long process of evolution. At first the docu-
ment could be "duly" negotiated only by one either lawfully in possession or to whom posses.
sion had been "entrusted" by the owner. Contrast the provisions of original Sections 32 and
38 of the Uniform Sales Act with the later amendments to those Sections.
4. See discussion infra, p. 1352.
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As the national market replaced the local market, so did mass pro-
duction replace the handiwork of the individual artisan. In disposing
of the factory's product, the forward contract largely replaced dickering
for the present sale of identified goods. With increasing frequency the
forward contract itself became a long-term arrangement, an annual con-
tract to take the factory's output or supply the buyer's requirements.
The stepchild of the common law, the credit sale, came into its own,
and the simple sale for cash no longer had much place except at the
far end of the distribution chain when the consumer bought his loaf
of bread.
We have sketched in the foregoing pages some of the discrepancies
which have grown up, since the early nineteenth century formulation
of our law of sales, between business practice and legal theory about
business practice. Thus far we have talked of common law and not of
statute. Except incidentally, as for example in the Factors' Acts, sales
law remained judge-made law throughout the century; but after the
first great period of creation, there was little development apart from
the fields of negotiable documents of title and, to some extent, warranty
law.
II
It is entirely possible that, had the judicial process been allowed to
continue, sales law would have been readjusted to the facts of economic
life in a fresh burst of legal creativeness. The success of our courts in
the last generation in scrapping tort law which proved unsuited to an
industrialized society suggests what the same courts might have done
on the commercial side. Judicial discretion was, however, replaced by a
codifying statute. The Uniform Sales Act, promulgated in 1906, was
shortly adopted in the principal commercial states and in time in all
but a few of the states.
From our retrospective vantage point, the changes which rendered
the common law of sales obsolete are easy to see. Half a century ago,
their form and nature were considerably more obscure. As a result, the
Uniform Sales Act largely reproduced the outdated patterns and the
simple generalizations of a hundred years earlier.
The Uniform Sales Act starts with the idea of a single transaction, a
sale, a metaphysical act which, just as a point is assumed to have no
extension in space, has no duration in time. There is a brooding em-
phasis on the passage of title, of "the property in the goods"-the two
expressions are used interchangeably-which underlies the failure to
take any distinction between professionals and non-professionals, in-
formed merchant and uninformed customer. Seller and Buyer remain
bloodless abstractions. Given that fundamental bias, problems of a
continuing contractual performance over a period of time are neces-
sarily slighted; that is not to say that such problems are ignored but
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rather that the basic conception in the draftsman's mind made it
nearly impossible that such problems should receive the schematic,
coherent treatment which their commercial importance merited.
The Act's concentration on the transfer of ownership of a single
identified chattel as the typical transaction caused many of its legal
presumptions to be diametrically opposed to commercial practice.
For example, the Act lays down the rule that "unless otherwise
agreed, delivery of the goods and payment of the price are concurrent
conditions. . . ." That is to say, in the absence of express stipulation
for credit, all sales are to be deemed for cash. This no doubt corre-
sponds to the understanding of consumers buying goods at retail.
With respect to the great majority of commercial contracts, however,
the presumption in fact seems to run the other way: apart from docu-
mentary contracts-cash against documents-delivery is understood
to be on the credit terms customary in the trade, and every trade has
its customary terms. Another example is the Act's provision that apart
from agreement or trade usage to the contrary, "the place of delivery
is the seller's place of business if he have one, and if not his residence."
Once again this is an accurate statement of the typical bargain only in
the cash and carry retail trade; elsewhere the underlying presumption
is no doubt that the goods will be delivered to the buyer or at his order.
A third example is the Act's predilection in favor of the single, in-
divisible non-severable contract of sale. Despite the inclusion of a
liberal definition of "divisible contract," the Act proceeds on the theory
that most contracts are indivisible wholes. This is reasonable if you
think of most contracts as concerning unique chattels, unreasonable if
you think principally of contracts calling for a large number of like
units, typically in more than one delivery. Under the Act's rather
wooden provisions it took a good deal of judicial ingenuity to work
out, on the one hand, the buyer's right of partial rescission when some
of the goods delivered were up to standard and some were not, and, on
the other hand, the seller's right to proceed with the balance of a con-
tract despite a trivial defect in an early instalment. Finally, the Act
codified, with certain exceptions, the rule of protection of the true
owner rather than of the good faith purchaser for value, Although the
rule had considerably relaxed it remained entirely possible under the
Uniform Act for goods to be exposed for sale with the consent of the
owner, and, even though sold in ordinary course to a good faith pur-
chaser, pass subject to equities of ownership. The bias, once again, was
fundamentally non-or anti-commercial.
It is not to be gainsaid, however, that the Act was drafted with
industry and skill and that some of its provisions achieved a needed
adjustment of theory to practice. The~Varranty provisions represented
a notable advance and broke cleanly with the more rigid common law
restrictions: the abrogation of the old rule that acceptance of non-con-
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forming goods bars an action for breach of warranty was in particular
a boon to commerce. We are apt to forget just how good the warranty
sections of the Act were since that branch of sales law has continued
its development with almost no regard for the restrictive provisions of
the Act. The handling of documents of title (which had been ignored in
the English Sale of Goods Act of a few years earlier) was also markedly
successful. It will be noted that the best parts of the act dealt with the
branches of the law which had not been frozen in the pattern of the
early period: warranty, which had continued its case-law development,
and documents of title, which were a later invention.
Despite its good features, the effect of the Act as a whole was to
perpetuate the split between the law of sales and business practice,
with the inevitable result that the law came to be less and less a living
thing. The surprising growth of commercial arbitration over the
past generation and the corresponding decrease in sales litigation
(which now comes in largely through the bankruptcy courts) may be
attributed in great part to the need of business to find tribunals which
would not apply obsolete rules of law to present-day disputes. The
flight from the law can also be noted in the development of elaborate
form contracts; since the presumptions of the statute so frequently run
counter to business understanding, it has become necessary to nail
down, in every possible contingency, the fact that there has been
"agreement otherwise" between the parties.
An obsolete general statute which remains on the books acts as a
brake or a drag but can never entirely block forward movement.
General language is not self-executing; fortunately, it is subject to con-
struction. The better courts have done a surprisingly ingenious job of
bending and warping the Act to fit the long-term arrangements in re-
spect to which the provisions of the Act are sadly deficient. In a sense,
the task of the courts in writing sound commercial law has been simpli-
fied by the Act's rather conventional coverage: the draftsman treated
only what was understood to be within the traditional body of sales law.
As a result, such matters as documentary contracts and letters of credit
(which were just beginning to come into extensive use in this country
when the Act was drafted) were left uncodified and have since enjoyed a
case-law development which has been on the whole exceedingly satis-
factory.
Although it is quite easy to point out where the Sales Act went
wrong, it does not follow that we can do better today, at least from the
view point of fifty years in the future. To underline the difficulties of
accurately blueprinting what is going on around us, let alone what is
about to happen, we cannot do better than pause to consider the un-
happy fate of a younger member of the Uniform family, the Conditional
Sales Act (1918).
The conditional sale originated as a useful device which allowed
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sellers to deliver goods in advance of payment without relinquishing
control. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, its history was
undistinguished. Toward the end of the century, it did have a short
flurry in the financing of railroad rolling stock but was quickly dropped
in favor of the equipment trust. Generally it was used in disposing of
certain types of goods-first furniture, later sewing machines-to
consumers, but never in any significant volume either in dollar amount
or in number of transactions. There could have been no reason to be-
lieve, when the Conditional Sales Act was drafted, that the conditional
sale was not a stable, well-understood legal form, ripe for codification.
Between 1900 and 1910 several enterprisers, with available capital
and an inquiring turn of mind, hit on the idea that money could be
made by financing the instalment sale of durable goods to consumers on
a scale that had never been attempted. The banks were entirely un-
interested in backing the venture-thus the finance companies were
born. Even the ingenious gentlemen who first began operating in this
twilight zone between banking and usury could hardly have anticipated
that the automobile would so quickly become a fixture in the American
way of life and that the miraculously magnified market for consumer
finance would find their companies with going organizations, estab-
lished operating techniques and increasing capital, just at the moment
when there was a killing to be made.
The finance companies, so far as legal form went, used title retention
devices: conditional sale or its twin the bailment lease. In jurisdictions
where neither was recognized, the chattel mortgage was put to work.
There was nothing revolutionary about the forms which the finance
company lawyers designed; the fine print expanded to settle every
known contingency not unfavorably to the finance company, but the
framework was standard. The only novel feature was that the con-
tract was invariably assigned by the dealer to the finance company.
As a result, the conditional sale as developed for use in consumer in-
stalment selling was a device which, like the bank letter of credit,
straddled over three distinct sets of contractual relationships: the
buyer-dealer contract, the dealer-finance company contract and the
finance company-buyer contract. The old fashioned seller-buyer con-
tract, which might be occasionally assigned or pledged to secure a
bank loan, was revolutionized by the introduction of the inevitable
assignee.
The draftsman of a commercial act is supposed to be the recorder of
established usage; he cannot be at his best when the subject matter
he is working on persists in taking on new shapes and forms. The
Conditional Sales Act entirely ignored the use of the assigned contract
in financing retail instalment sales. Aside from defining "seller" to
include "any legal successor in interest" and suggesting, in the com-
mentary to the Act, that the seller's assignee stood in the shoes of the
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seller,5 the Act was blank on the problems raised by the interposition
of a third-party financing agent into what apparently was regarded as
essentially a two-party arrangement.
The problems raised and not solved by the Act were both legal and
economic or social. On the legal side: Can a buyer, having a breach of
warranty claim against the dealer set off the amount of the claim
against the unpaid balance due the finance company? Can the buyer
effectively waive against the finance company some or all of the de-
fenses or claims he may have against the dealer? Can the buyer after
assignment make any adjustments with the dealer which will bind the
finance company? Other unanswered problems had a wider social
importance. Should there be a requirement of full disclosure to the
buyer of the terms of the contract or should the proliferating fine print
be allowed to continue its cancerous growth unchecked? Should there
be any limitation placed, under the usury laws or otherwise, on the
various items that went into the "time price," finance, service or carry-
ing charge? Should the finance company be allowed to make a profit
on the insurance that went with the car or other chattel? Should kick-
backs from finance company to dealer or tie-in arrangements between
manufacturer and finance company which squeeze the dealer be regu-
lated or prohibited?
Such were a few of the questions to which the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act provided no answer. Nor indeed could it have been expected
to give the answers, since the questions themselves, while the Act was
being drafted, had not yet been asked.
III
There has grown up over the years an extensive literature calling for
the amendment or revision of the earlier Uniform Acts, particularly the
Negotiable Instruments Law and the Sales Act. In 1940, the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Law jointly undertook the considerable project of preparing
a comprehensive Commercial Code which would supplant the various
commercial acts already in the field and cover as well much matter
which had previously escaped codification. Although the Code is now
nearing completion, the only Article which has been made publicly
available, albeit in tentative form, is the Revised Sales Act. It is not
unreasonable to consider the Revised Act as indicative of the approach
of the draftsmen of the Code as a whole.
In the Revised Sales Act, a notable effort has been made to conform
the law to current business practice. We may indicate how thoroughly
sales law has been cut loose from its common law moorings by running
one of the classical cases through the applicable hoops of the new act.
5. See 2A UNIFos.x LAWS ANNOTATED § 40.
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Every law student is familiar with the unhappy events catalogued
in the great case of Tarling v. Baxter. On the 4th of January, 1825,
one Tarling entered into an agreement to buy a stack of hay from
Baxter; the hay was already cut and standing in a field belonging to
Baxter's brother. The bought and sold notes signed by the parties
provided for payment on the 4th of February. Baxter had requested
Tarling to "give him a bill" for the purchase price, but Tarling, in the
language of the opinion, "rather objected." Nevertheless a few days
later Tarling did accept such as bill, presented to him by still another
of the Baxter brothers. The bill, dated January 4 and payable at one
month from date, came into the hands of a third party, to whom
Tarling paid it when due. Before then, however, the hay had been ac-
cidentally destroyed by fire. Both parties were in agreement that
Tarling would not have been allowed to remove the hay before Feb-
ruary 4, due day of the note. The action was by Tarling against Baxter
to recover back the amount of the note as money paid to the defend-
ant's use, the defendant claiming a set-off for the purchase price of
the hay.
It was clear to the court, and equally clear to the draftsmen of the
Uniform Act nearly a century later, that the proper rule of law was as
follows: Where there is an unconditional contract to sell specific goods
in a deliverable state, the property (and consequently the risk) in the
goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made and it is immate-
rial whether the time of payment, or the time of delivery, or both, be
postponed. Judgment absolute, therefore, for Baxter, the defendant sell-
er. The bland and certain pronouncements of the judges, unsupported
by any ghost of authority, have stood for a hundred years as the very
fountainhead of the law of sales.
The Revised Sales Act treats of the matter in Section 79: Risk of
Loss in the Absence of Breach. Since subsection 1 is directed only to
cases where "the contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the
goods," our case must fall within subsection 2 which provides:
"In a case not within subsection 1 if the seller is a merchant the
risk of loss passes to the buyer on his receipt of the goods; otherwise
the risk passes to him on tender of delivery."
We note first that where the common law and the Uniform Act had
one rule, the Revised Act sets up two: one for a merchant seller, one for
a non-merchant seller-the merchant seller to bear the risk until
physical delivery of the goods, the non-merchant until the goods have
been tendered, tender being elsewhere (§ 73(1) ) defined as putting the
goods "at the buyer's disposition." In view of the agreement between
the parties that the haystack was not to be at Tarling's disposition
6. 6 B. & C. 360 (K.B. 1827).
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until February 4, it seems clear that the decision on the facts of Tarling
v. Baxter must be reversed, whether the seller was a "merchant" or
not. It is instructive to note, however, that "merchant" receives a
surprisingly expansive definition in the Revised Act (§ 7(1) ) :"a person
who by his occupation holds himself out as having the knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or in
any particular phase of it." Baxter, therefore, whether he was a farmer
or a commission man dealing in hay, would qualify as a "merchant"
and thus, apart from specific agreement otherwise, bear the risk as long
as the goods remained in his possession.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the Revised Act has broken
with its predecessor not only by selecting entirely different presump-
tions of law but also by differentiating the commercial from the non-
commercial sale.
We may consider in some detail one other type of case, the forward
contract of sale in which the buyer, by payment in advance, finances
the seller's operation. A good recent example is Ely & Walker Dry
Goods Co. v. Adams Ifg. Co., In. 7 Here the buyer ordered several
thousand pieces of gnat net of specified width, length and color. Pay-
ment in full was made in January, 1937 and various shipments vere
made thereafter at the buyer's order until May when, something more
than a third of the order remaining undelivered, the seller was placed
in reorganization and no further deliveries were made. Netting of the
proper color to fill the undelivered balance of the order had been man-
ufactured and was in the seller's plant on the date the reorganization
proceeding was begun. None of this netting, however, had been segre-
gated for the buyer and much of it had not been cut into the required
length and width. Reorganization of the seller was unsuccessful and
liquidation was ordered. The buyer, appearing in the liquidation pro-
ceedings, sought either to reclaim, or to establish a lien for the value of,
netting sufficient to make up the undelivered balance of its order for
which it had already paid. The buyer's petition was dismissed on the
ground that there had been no "unconditional appropriation" of goods
"in a deliverable state" to the contract and that therefore the buyer
could have no preferred claim in the liquidation. Under the statute and
in the light of existing doctrine the court's ruling was perfectly sound;
even if "appropriation" had been found, the buyer would still have
faced the hurdle of proving that the retention of goods sold by the
seller was not fraudulent as to creditors. The holding indicates the very
slight degree of protection which a financing buyer can claim under
present law on seller's insolvency under a contract for future delivery.
One of the most interesting provisions of the Revised Act (§ 54) pur-
ports to reverse this long established doctrine. A mercantile buyer who
7. 105 F. 2d 906 (2d Cir. 1939).
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has made enabling advances to aid the seller in carrying out a particular
production operation "acquires"-apparently without having specif-
ically contracted therefor-a lien on "any goods, which have become
identified as intended for the contract even through they have not been
appropriated or reached a state obligating the buyer to take delivery."
Furthermore, Section 55(1) of the Act provides that retention for a
reasonable time of goods sold by a merchant-seller is not fraudulent as
to creditors. The buyer's lien is, however, subordinated to purchasers
including mortgagees and pledgees, in current course.
Enough has been said to make clear that problems incident to the
performance of mercantile or commercial contracts are spotlighted in
the Revised Act. In this respect, Sections 99 through 102, Insecurity,
Instalments and Repudiation, are particularly interesting. The Uniform
Act had included sketchy provisions on instalment delivery contracts
so arbitrary and non-commercial that the better courts had to sweat
through to reasonable decisions. In contrast, the Revised Act sets up
well thought out and flexible standards of performance. The key
thought is that, in non-documentary, long-term contracts, minor non-
conformity should not be ground for rejection or repudiation provided
that the substantial value of the entire instalment or contract is not
impaired and that there is adequate assurance in fact that defects will
be cured and that future performance will be proper.
The Sales Article of the Commercial Code has also gone considerably
beyond the Uniform Act in the protection accorded buyers from mer-
chants: the good faith purchaser for value from a merchant-seller takes
clear title to any goods which the true owner has delivered to the seller,
on whatever condition (§ 57(2)(c) ). Thus the commercial sale is pro-
tected, even in circumstances where the casual, non-commercial trans-
action may be stricken down. Twin sets of remedies, possessory and
non-possessory, which have long been a distinguishing feature of sales
law, have been abandoned in favor of a sing!e set, phrased in terms of
contract rather than property law. In the warranty sections, the Re-
vised Act has followed the trend of the case law under the Uniform Act
in broadening the scope of seller's liability: the new provisions seem
particularly successful in the treatment of the vital problem, untouched
by the Uniform Act, of how far disclaimers of warranty should be
allowed to operate. Finally, as might be expected, the Revised Act goes
into considerably more detail than did the Uniform Act in its treatment
of the document of title and the documentary contract.
IV
It is apparent that from the point of view adopted in this paper the
Revised Sales Act is an impressive piece of work, both in substance
and form. Nevertheless, there are several caveats which, with great
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respect and deference to the chief artisans of the Code, I shall set down.
First, it is a matter of vital importance that the Code as a whole be
kept in terms of such generality as to allow an easy and unstrained
application of its provisions to new patterns of business behavior.
Commercial codification cannot successfully overparticularize: the
penalty for being too precise is that the statute will have to keep com-
ing in for repairs (and amendment is a costly, cumbersome and unsat-
isfactory process) orelse become a dead-letter.
The Revised Sales Act, as printed in the second edition of Bogert's
Cases on Saes, runs to 135 sections and 47 pages. The Uniform Sales
Act has 79 sections and, in the same edition, 27 pages. The count on
the English Sale of Goods Act is 64 sections and 17 pages. By way of
extreme contrast, the provisions of the French Code of 1804 relating to
the law of sales run to a scant 40 sections and printed in the same
format would hardly take up 10 pages. Indeed, the French provisions
are so fragmentary and of such extreme generality that it is safe to say
that, in substance although not in form, sales law has been on an un-
codified, case-law footing in France for at least the past fifty- years.
Not only does the Revised Act have just short of twice the bulk of
the Uniform Act; the new act (§ 1(2) ) invites the courts to consult
the Official Comments "to determine the underlying reasons, purposes
and policies" of the Act and as a guide to its construction and applica-
tion. This provision apparently gives the Comments an odd sort of
quasi-statutory status. Although they are not yet available in final
form, a number of Comments on particular sections have been printed
to accompany tentative drafts of the Act. Those that have appeared
are sometimes learned, sometimes brilliant, and not infrequently run
to the length of law review articles. They are extremely specific in
explaining what the draftsman had in mind, and in stating that the
holdings in cases A, B, C, and D have been codified, while the holdings
in other named cases have been rejected.
The decision to give an official quasi-statutory status to the Com-
ments is unfortunate. The statutory draftsman, like the common law
dog, is entitled to only one bite. Statutes should not come equipped
with an elaborate law-review apparatus for reiterating in footnotes
what has (or should have) been already set out in the text. On the
basis of the Comments that have appeared, it would not be difficult to
cite examples where the draftsman has wisely left a breathing space,
so to say, in the text to allow a free case-law development and then
come back in the Comment to nail the coffin lid down tightly.
Quite apart from the doubtful use of Official Comments, the prin-
cipal reproach that may be brought against the Revised Sales Act it-
self is its proneness to indulge in excessive detail. In a sense this is the
defect of the Act's greatest single virtue: a keen awareness of the im-
portance of reflecting actual business practice. The same flair that has
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enabled the draftsman to produce what must be one of the finest drafts
in the history of commercial legislation may also be responsible for his
Flemish tendency to draw in every leaf on every tree. In a sense, the
fondness for the hypothetical case which is bred in the bone of lawyers
brought up in a case-method teaching system may be partly responsi-
ble. A drafting conference typically proceeds by testing proposed lan-
guage against the widest variety of hypothetical situations which those
present can imagine. When a hole is discovered, the instinctive reaction
is to plug it with new language. In the process an initially simple state-
ment may take on Byzantine convolutions.
Furthermore, the Sales Act is but one Article of the proposed Code.
Multiply its fifty pages by five, six or seven and we end up with several
hundred pages-a thousand or more separate sections-of tightly
written text whose various parts are interrelated in a by no means
simple manner. With all the good will and industry in the world, it will
be years before the bench and bar have mastered the intricacies and
explored the implications of so massive a statute. If the structure does
grow to such grotesque proportions, a very probable result would be an
increase in litigation and legal uncertainty for a considerable period
of time.
Good draftsmen's early drafts will customarily be more complicated
than the final product. Simplicity takes time and sweat. Although the
main lines of policy are presumably fixed, the published version of the
Sales Act is still marked tentative. When the process of drafting has
been completed on the balance of the Code, the time will be appropriate
for going to work on the entire corpus with a blue pencil.
Second, the times may well be out of joint for the production of a
Commercial Code.
We have noted earlier how technological change cracked and twisted
the traditional structure of sales law and how, in the case of the condi-
tional sale, a sudden and unexpected mutation in what had been
thought to be a stable legal form left a codifying statute obsolete before
enactment.
In the present post-war period, following ten years of unprecedented
expansion of the national productive capacity, industrial and commer-
cial practices are fluid and subject to sudden change. It is not hard to
demonstrate that change is taking place and that the rate of change is
accelerating, but when, at what point and in what form the economy
will achieve relative stability, if there is indeed such a prospect at all,
is unpredictable. It is, however, possible to lay hold of a few straws in
the wind.
The promising development of air transportation has notable impli-
cations in the field of documentary contracts. Use of negotiable docu-
ments of title in long distance shipments has been predicated on the
fact that the documents will in normal course reach destination con-
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siderably ahead of the goods. Thus there has developed that well
settled body of documentary law according to which payment or rejec-
tion is made on the documents alone without reference to the goods.
Tender of defective documents is a default even though conforming
goods underlie the documents, while tender of proper documents en-
titles the seller to payment even though he has shipped non-conforming
goods. The time-gap between receipt of documents and arrival of the
goods has also made possible the practice of selling and reselling the
goods in transit by transfers of the documents, without the added ex-
pense of warehousing. None of this body of law fits into the pattern of
rapid transportation of goods by air; indeed, the very use of the order
bill of lading in air (as in truck) transportation is rendered nearly im-
possible by the carriers' present lack of terminal Narehouse facilities.
It is easy to predict that as air freight gropes its way out of its experi-
mental stage, new legal patterns for controlling and financing goods in
transit will develop; it is less easy to say what the new patterns will
be. One interesting suggestion, designed to reintroduce the time gap,
is to allow the transmission, before shipment, of copies of the docu-
ments by radio or television.
Industrial finance, particularly in the acquisition of short term
working capital, has greatly changed during the past ten years; it is
difficult to say whether the change was a temporary war-production
phenomenon or the beginning of a permanent shift in our financing
habits. Nevertheless, the borrowing of capital against the security of
accounts receivable, chattel paper and tangible inventory, both by
manufacturers and distributors, has increased in scale and may even
be supplanting to some extent the standard methods of acquiring long
term capital by bond and stock issue. Accounts receivable financing in
particular, which for many years was carried on in the business equiva-
lent of the red light district, has turned respectable. Here, as in the
related field of consumer finance, the banks are actively competing
with the finance companies for business which not so long ago they
disdained. Meanwhile, the finance companies continue to break new
ground by profitably lending money on the security of supposedly
non-bankable assets.
It is entirely possible that our distribution system is also undergoing
significant change. Cooperative associations of producers, retailers,
and to a lesser extent of consumers, are increasingly cutting the
middleman's profit from the cost of marketing. National and regional
mail order houses and chain stores have the same effect. The integrated
operation, with centralized control which may extend from the extrac-
tion of raw materials to the retail distribution of finished products, may
become typical of the next stage of industrial organization. If the in-
dependent agent, whose appearance led to the shattering and eventual
abandonment of property law concepts of ownership, in his turn dis-
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appears, how much of our present "mercantile" law will still be rele-
vant in a fundamentally altered context?
Our list of straws in the wind could be almost indefinitely multiplied.
The startling increase in the range and complexity of goods and services
put on the market will undoubtedly lead to far-reaching changes in
our thinking about seller's obligations just as did the equally dramatic
but less rapid advances of the 19th century. What, for one example,
will be the long-term effect of prefabricated housing on the law of con-
struction contracts? The possible uses of atomic energy are unknown
but will presumably be more than routine. Increasing segments of
industry are coming under direct government subsidy-aircraft and
artificial rubber, for example-and since 1929 and particularly during
the war, government guarantees and direct government lending have
played an important role in supplementing or supplanting private
sources of capital.
The draftsmen of the Commercial Code do not have a reliable
crystal ball. It does little good to counsel them to be alert to detect
change, since the direction of change is unknowable except from a
vantage point safely in the future. The only lesson that can be drawn
from the fact that society is in flux is the one already made: keep the
Code, in its final form, as general, as unspecific as possible. Let the
strategic strong points be as widely spaced as they can be and still de-
fend the essential territory.
Thirdly and lastly, we should consider the present and the probable
future limits of government intervention in and regulation of business
agreement.
American lawyers have traditionally thought of private commercial
law as being in one watertight compartment and public control of
business in another. The separation of two halves of an indivisible
whole has never been logically sound; it is rapidly becoming manifestly
untenable. Consider for example the effects of the recent basing-point
decision on pricing policies, the distribution of goods and, no doubt,
on the location of new industry. Consider the increasing role of the
Federal Government in business activity-as purchaser, producer,
part owner, guarantor or bank, and regulator. Consider, in the par-
ticular field of our discussion, the increasing number of states which
have recently established agencies to supervise the activities of com-
panies engaged in financing consumer instalment sales. Although the
political weather is doubtful, nothing is less likely than that the future
,will see a protracted period of unregulated private agreement.
Here again there is little the draftsman can do except exercise
caution and walk warily. What is certain is that a 19th century laissez-
faire code, or a code drafted with such an underlying bias, will be far
from adequate in an economy which has scrapped laissez-faire prin-
ciples.
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We must not delude ourselves as to the benefits which can be derived
from a general codification, however admirably executed. Experience
with code law has demonstrated that it is impossible accurately to
assess or project the effects of contemporary change. And the accel-
erating rate of change in our own day makes the enterprise incompa-
rably more hazardous than it was fifty years ago. In the field of com-
mercial activity, in the area in which private agreement still operates,
that code is best, in a sense, which codifies least.
Even in a civil-law jurisdiction like France, whose commercial law
is nominally codified, the code provisions have been allowed to moulder
unamended for a hundred and fifty years while a flourishing case law,
jurisprudence, has gradually taken over. There has as yet been no
move in England to replace its commercial acts, ten or twenty years
older than ours, with streamlined models. As statutes pass quietly out
of date without disappearing from the books, the effect is to reintroduce
a common law case system, which is perhaps peculiarly fitted to deal
with the fluctuations and mutations of commercial life.
The theory of the proposed Commercial Code is that we must keep
our statutes up to date. If the project is successfully carried through,
we should understand that we have probably committed ourselves to
basic revisions at fairly short time intervals. However excellent the
new Code may be it will no doubt be necessary, in another twenty-
five years or so, to revise the revisions.
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